Support for the two-state solution in principle falls below half for Palestinians and Israeli Jews – 46% of both populations support this solution today; Arab citizens of Israel are the only population showing a strong majority in favor (83%). Palestinian attitudes become more pessimistic in general and support for militancy rose following US President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Jewish Israeli support for two states has not changed since June 2017 (47% in June). Still both sides prefer the two-state solution to all other conflict resolution options. Although only a minority of Israelis and Palestinians support the detailed package for implementation – 40% of Palestinians and 43% of Israelis (just 35% among Jews) – the opposition is still flexible: a package of incentives tested among those opposed to the solution showed that nearly half of Jews and 40% of Palestinians might change their minds to support the agreement under the right conditions, bringing support to a majority on both sides.

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

- Support for the two-state solution stands at 46% among Palestinians and Israeli Jews. In June 2017, 53% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews supported that solution. Among Israeli Arabs, support for the two-state solution stands today at 83%.
- Still, fewer people on both sides support three possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights, one state without rights, and expulsion or “transfer.”
Only 40% of Palestinians (compared to 43% in June 2017) and 35% of Israeli Jews (a three-point increase from the June survey) support a permanent peace agreement package, along with 85% of Israeli Arabs – typical of the high level support from Israeli Arabs in previous surveys. In total, 43% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises: a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. Forty-eight percent of Israelis (55% of Israeli Jews) and 57% of Palestinians are opposed to the two-state comprehensive package.

The skepticism about the package appears closely related to serious doubts about feasibility. Palestinians and Israelis are both divided almost equally about whether a two-state solution is still possible, or whether settlements have expanded too much to make it viable. Among all Israelis, nearly half believes the solution is still viable (48%), while 42% think settlements have spread too much for it to be viable, although among Jews more think it is not viable (46% compared to 42% who think it is). Among Palestinians, 60% say the two-state solution is no longer viable (an eight-point increase), while 37% think it is. But fully 75% and 73% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, respectively, do not expect a Palestinian state to be established in the next five years.

Despite the majority rejection of the two-state implementation package, their opposition can be shifted significantly based on added policy incentives. For example, 44% of Jews who are opposed would change their minds if the Palestinian government commits itself to ongoing security cooperation like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, preventing attacks and arresting terror suspects – bringing total support to a 59% majority. Among Palestinians who are opposed to the package, 39% would change their minds to support the agreement if Israel recognized the Nakba and the suffering of refugees and provides compensation to the refugees. When the Palestinians who change their minds for this item are added to original supporters, 62% support the agreement.

When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 26% of the Palestinians and 38% of Israeli Jews choose “reach a peace agreement.” However, in a departure from previous attitudes 38% of Palestinians (compared to just over one-fifth last June) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 18% (compared to 12% last June) called for “a definitive war with the Palestinians.”

The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 7-10 December, 2017. The number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 830 and in the Gaza Strip 440. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between 29 November to 14 December, 2017.
The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 650, West Bank settlers 100, and Israeli Arabs 150. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is 3%. It should be noted that the entire Palestinian survey was conducted immediately after the announcement by President Donald Trump that the US recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and during a period of limited Palestinian-Israeli confrontations. Most of the Israeli data was collected prior to the declaration, and about 20% of the sample responded immediately following. The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.

MAIN FINDINGS

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The following compare and contrast findings among Israeli-Palestinian public opinion in the coming weeks, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews and Palestinian West Bank settlers (or Gazaans) found we all provide several clues for the subgroups.

...
### Perceptions of public support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israeli Jews</th>
<th>Israeli settlers</th>
<th>Israeli Arab</th>
<th>Palestinians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun-16</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-16</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun-17</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>46%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec-17</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israeli Jews</th>
<th>Israeli settlers</th>
<th>Israeli Arab</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>83%</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2016</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2017</td>
<td>51%</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2017</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among Israeli Jews, clearly a majority think the two-state solution is a good solution, and 39% compared to 42% last June think the majority of Israeli Arab do not think the two-state solution is a good solution. Among Palestinian Arabs, fully 75% compared to 71% last June think the two-state solution is a good solution. Among Israeli Jews, clearly a majority think the two-state solution is a good solution, and 73% compared to 69% last June think the majority of Israeli Arabs think it is a good solution.
Peace and violence.
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Israe �  Je w s
On 3 August 2012 is the anniversary of the emergence of Gazans and West Bankers in their pre-election for two-state solution and their associated support. But issues emerge when looking at country association vote prior to the renewables of Fatah only group and adjoining minority support for two-state solution followed by the homemade with about fifteen percent. This is the second previous survey to Hava voter for two-state solution is highest among secular and traditional Jews. The preferred state over other and two-state and expulsion option equally and Ultra (where the equal solution is followed by the Ultra). But when looking for two-state solution is higher than others among a group including al-Ahli, a moderate group. Onl
Finally, when looking into Israel and the Palestinian territories, once the overlap in early 1990s is removed, once again, for two-state solution, a substantial support for one-state solution. This means that, in the case of Israeli Jews and Palestinians, once the overlap in early 1990s is removed, once again, for two-state solution, a substantial support for one-state solution. This means that, in the case of Israeli Jews and Palestinians, once the overlap in early 1990s is removed, once again, for two-state solution, a substantial support for one-state solution.
Some people recommend the following solution: the creation of two states, Palestine and Israel, which enter into a confederation whereby citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections. There would be freedom of movement for all, and Jerusalem is not divided but serves as the capital of two states. Israel and Palestine would deal jointly with security and the economy.
After we went over main terms of two-state solution ...(demilitarization...equal territorial exchange, family unification/100,000 Palestinian refugees to Israel, E. Jm/Palestine, W. Jm/Israel, end of the conflict...support or oppose permanent settlement in general? (% “support”)
1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 59% of Israeli Jews support this, including 40% of West Bank settlers.

2. The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry). Only 20% of Palestinians support this, and more than three-quarters (77%) oppose the demilitarized state. Among Israeli Jews, 56% support this item; a nearly-identical percentage of Israeli Arabs (55%) support it.

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Among Palestinians, 36% support this. Israeli Jews were divided, with 48% for and 45% against this item; among Israeli Arabs, 69% supported it.

4. The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. 30% of Palestinians support this (40% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank). Among Israeli Jews, 38% support this, and among Israeli Arabs 56% support it.

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. 34% of Palestinians support this, 39% among Gazans and 31% among West Bankers. 37% of Israeli Jews support this and just 12% of settlers (85% are opposed). 71% of Arabs support this item.

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel. Just a little over a quarter of Palestinians (27%) support the territorial exchange. 35% of Israeli Jews support this, and 68% of Israeli Arabs, with settlers showing nearly the same breakdown as the previous item.

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Less than a quarter (23%) of Jews support this item, and only 5% among West Bank settlers.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. 28% of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement, with 66% opposed.

   In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. Here again, just over one-quarter (26%) of Palestinians support the division of the Old City, with only small differences between Gaza and the West Bank. 71% of Palestinians are opposed to this item. Almost two-thirds of Israeli Arabs support this (65%).
9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated. A majority of Palestinians support this, 52%, and 45% are opposed. This item shows some difference between Gazans – with 57% support – and West Bankers, with 50% support. This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: 19% support the arrangement on refugees, while 74% are opposed, and 92% - essentially a consensus among West Bank settlers. Israeli Arabs show the opposite trend: 85% support it, with 13% opposed.

*Perception of social support for package.*

*Regional and demographic trends.*
Feasibility - doubts.
Among Israeli settlers that the peace talks are still viable, 50% support the freeze for Israel and the European Union agreement rise in support for agreement in May of establishing a Palestinian state in the next five years.

Among Palestinian settlers that the peace talks are still viable, 58% support the freeze, support for agreement in February of establishing a Palestinian state in the next five years.
Our joint effort to explore the extent to which citizens are "firm" or "flexible" that when a city changes its mind in favor. To this end, developed a series of cases could be a step to an agreement, and proposed them to include full detailed cases not noted, this included 55% of Israeli Jews.

Aside from antisemitism, so far antisemitism is similar, and can be made or not. Three cases tested into making an Israeli-Palestinian agreement that the Palestinian state will have a capital and continue a joint commission of a joint commission of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to provide for all aspects to ensure the implementation of the agreement on both sides. The other cases were to specify a way to one agreement for example Israeli Jews – a simple Mount/Al-Aqsa or a town Israeli/Arab, to include teachers, to implement the Palestinian state along with they are standing for Palestinian Israeli, and provided compensation to agreees, and a Palestinian including agreees, to agree with the state of Israeli mainly their Palestinian can the

The cases were tested at question a set of question only among full cases of two-state agreement.

1. And if the agreement is part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 37% of Israeli Jews who opposed the agreement at first, said that they would now
support it. Added to those who already support the agreement, a total of 55% of Israeli Jews would support it with this item.

*If in addition to the above items of the permanent settlement package, Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty?* 24% of Palestinians who did not support the initial package said they would support it if this case. Added to those who already support the agreement, a total of 54% of Palestinians would support it with this item.

2. **And if the agreement states that the state of Palestine will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures?** 40% of Israeli Jews said this would make them support the agreement.

37% of Palestinians said they would support the agreement with this item.

3. **And what if the agreement includes formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides?** 39% of Jewish Israelis who initially opposed the agreement said they would support if it this item was included.

More than one quarter (27%) of Palestinians opposed would support the agreement if it included this item.

4. **What if the agreement states that Israeli Jews, including settlers, are allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Palestine while maintaining their Israeli citizenship, as long as they are law abiding?** 35% of Israeli Jews would support the agreement with this item.

**And if agreement states that Palestinians, including refugees, are allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Israel while maintaining their Palestinian citizenship, as long as they are law abiding?** Among those opposed, 25% said they would change their minds and support an agreement if it includes this item.

5. **And if the Palestinians return to a Palestinian state, and the agreement states that they do not have the collective right to return to Israel proper, with exceptions only for family reunification?** 31 of Jewish Israelis would support the agreement in this case.

**And if the agreement states that the state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law?** 21% of Palestinians said this would make them change their minds and support an agreement.

6. **And if the Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, arresting terror suspects and preventing attacks?** For this item, 44% of Israeli Jews said they would change their minds from opposing to supporting the agreement. When added to the original number of supporters of the original agreement, 59% of Israeli Jews in total would support the package if it includes this incentive.

**And if the agreement allows the current Palestinian National Security Force to become an army with light weapons but without heavy weapons?** 16% of Palestinians, said they would change their minds and support the original agreement based on this addition.

7. **And if the agreement allows Jews to visit at the Temple Mount?** 47% of Israeli Jews said they would support the agreement in that case. Added to those who already support the agreement, about 61% of Israeli Jews would support it with this item.

**And if the agreement states that Israel recognizes the Nakba and the suffering of refugees, and provides compensation to refugees?** 39% of Palestinians said they would support the package in that case. Added to those who already support the agreement, about 62% of Palestinians would support it with this item.
Incentives for those opposed to two-state combined package: Israeli Jews

If the agreement included… Would you support or oppose the agreement? Support

Incentives for those opposed to two-state combined package: Palestinians

If the agreement included… Would you support or oppose the agreement? Support
(2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution

We sought to examine for a more nuanced to the ongoing approach to negotiating that characterizes the survey and five regional approaches to negotiation: 1) an Arab forum in which parties including Egypt and Jordan call on the US and a face-to-face process; 3) an EU-led approach; 4) an American-led approach; 5) and a US-Romanian-French approach that in the eyes of Palestinians are receptive to a first regional, approach and June 2017 and 27% in current surveys followed by an EU and an approach specifically a presence); choosing an American-Romanian approach, and a regional approach b) a US-Romanian-French approach. The polarisation over the role of the US is finding a common thread effects on ongoing perception in Israeli society that both bodies are biased against Israel, a theme regularly mentioned in public discourse.

(3) How Israelis and Palestinians View Each Other:
probes the extent of zero tolerance pictures only clearly with trees in our survey, achieving an assessment of each side's own conditions early among Palestinians in the West Bank, showing significant change.

Among Palestinians 37% agree that Israel senses a sense of impunity from June 2017, whereas 44% of Palestinians think that it is less than one year ago, whereas 33% in June. Among Israelis, 85% agree that Palestinians sense a significant change.

True to survey also lists areas are very and trust is standing among Palestinians a major year ago. The majority of Israelis are absolute반응 are % in June). The majority of Israelis are against: 61% agree that Israelis agree, and disagree.

On the Israeli side, equalizers think that Palestinians can be trusted, and are unchanging % in June and 19% agree with an interest in the they can be trusted. Trust is informed by a prevailing option of both, that Palestinians -relations "Nothing can that's good for the side is good for the other." for side is for other side. For show that 51% of Israeli Jews compare to 53% in June, 60% of Palestinians (unchanging in June) agree with this.

Feared:

Palestinians who Israeli soldiers as they are Israeli soldiers and weaponry. 46% agree with the statement "I am afraid of Israeli soldiers and weaponry," whereas 35% agree with the statement about Jews. This trend is clearly confirmed. There is a significant change in these conditions. Similarly, 53% of West Bankers do - which could reflect that West Bankers have significant daily contact with such figures.

Among Israelis, a majority of 57% agree with the statement "I fear the third Palestinians." From June 2017 and since 2016 two-thirds that by both previous surveys among sellers 79% agree. Regarding Israeli-Jewish relations, 81% of Jews agree that they fear Israeli-Jewish relations of Israelis agree.

Generalization to the general

71% of Palestinians consider conditions in the Palestinian state (considerably better in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip). These findings are 26-point higher than the nearest one concerning conditions among bank officials.

The Ministry of Health was asked to develop a plan of action for the new year, beginning in the month of January.
(4) Values and Goals

We ask Israeis about the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Jews are asked about values of: (1) the majority, (2) the Israeli, (3) peace, and a Jewish majority are among the most important values and specifically) followed by the percentage of Israeli citizens, (4) building a social and civil society and (5) Palestinian leadership and the year. The percentage of Jewish goals remains Israeli to 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with Jews compared to 4% last June), followed by (6) a right to return to 1948 (7) a civil and religious system (9% are a point of view of previous survey in June).